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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education' in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 12
exemplifies the long-running disagreement over the meaning of racial
discrimination under the Constitution. One approach, reflected in the
Parents Involved majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts and in the
concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, endorses colorblindness: the view
that race is virtually always and everywhere irrelevant to public policy.
Another approach, reflected in the dissenting opinions of Justices Ste-
vens and Breyer, appears to embrace anti-subordination: the view that
promoting interracial association is desirable as a matter of principle be-
cause it seeks to overcome the stigma that has long attached to people of
color in the United States.3
This Article examines some of the jurisprudential roots of the racial
discrimination debate, tracing the issue back to Brown and its immediate
aftermath but finding the seeds of the disagreement in the ambiguities of
the first Justice Harlan's celebrated dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Fer-
guson.4 The tensions between the two approaches did not matter in
I Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, and Professor of Law, Case Western Re-
serve University. I want to thank Bryan Adamson for inviting me to participate in the "Brown Un-
done" conference and the editors of the Seattle University Law Review for allowing me to contribute
to their symposium issue.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3. These are not the only possible approaches. Indeed, Justice Kennedy, whose opinion concur-
ring in the judgment determined the outcome in Parents Involved, attempted to stake out an interme-
diate position. His basic sympathies clearly lay with the colorblind approach; he was receptive to
some consideration of race but rejected the pupil-assignment policies at issue as placing excessive
weight on that factor. This Article focuses mainly on the two principal approaches described in the
text.
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Plessy because segregation was impermissible under either theory, but
the two approaches pointed in opposite directions in Parents Involved.
Part II offers an overview of the Seattle and Louisville policies that were
struck down in Parents Involved. Part III examines the various opinions
in Parents Involved to illuminate the basic theoretical differences that
divided the Court. Part IV examines the iconic decision in Brown and
explores the aftermath of that ruling as lower courts struggled to deter-
mine how to remedy unconstitutional school segregation with little guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, which did not grapple with remedial com-
plexities for more than a dozen years after handing down its landmark
ruling. Finally, Part V examines the complexities of Justice Harlan's
Plessy dissent and how those complexities continue to reverberate in the
contemporary debate about racial discrimination.
II. THE STUDENT-ASSIGNMENT POLICIES N PARENTS INVOLVED
The Supreme Court rejected voluntary efforts by public school dis-
tricts in Seattle and Louisville to promote a more heterogeneous student
body by taking race into account in assigning pupils to specific schools. 5
Although the two cities have very different histories, their past racial
practices had received attention from the Supreme Court.6 Perhaps the
most obvious difference between the two districts is that the Seattle
schools had never been legally segregated,7 whereas the Louisville
schools had been for many decades. 8 In fact, the Louisville schools were
declared unitary only a few years before the district adopted the policy
that was struck down in Parents Involved.9
The details of the Seattle and Louisville policies vary, but both dis-
tricts sought to keep the racial demography of each school relatively
close to the overall pattern within the district as a whole. The Seattle pol-
icy applied only to the city's ten high schools. The school board tried to
keep the white and nonwhite percentages within 10 points of the overall
figures for the district, which was 41% white; the permissible variation
5. Seattle has a city-based school district. Louisville has long had a metropolitan school dis-
trict: the Jefferson County Public Schools. This difference does not affect any of the legal issues at
stake in the Parents Involved decision.
6. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down a state ini-
tiative that limited the ability of local school boards to promote racially diverse student bodies);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a Louisville racial zoning ordinance).
7. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747.
8. Id. at 2749. The Louisville schools had long been segregated by law when Brown was de-
cided. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 927-28 (6th Cir. 1973), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 418 U.S. 918, on remand, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
Nearly twenty years after Brown, the Louisville-Jefferson County schools remained unconstitution-
ally segregated. Id. at 929.
9. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
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was later increased to 15 percentage points. 0 The Louisville policy ap-
plied to all schools in the Jefferson County school system and sought to
keep the African American enrollment in each school between 15 and
50% in a district whose overall enrollment was about 34 percent African
American. 11
Significantly, both school boards adopted their policies to promote
integration: to have a more racially diverse student body in each affected
school. They based their policies on the notion that promoting integration
was legally and morally a worthy goal and that considering race for this
beneficent purpose was vastly different from using race as a device to
promote segregation. The plaintiffs disagreed; they argued that race
was an illegitimate factor in pupil assignment, no matter why that factor
was used and no matter how much other factors affected individual as-
signments. 13
III. THE PARENTS INVOL VED OPINIONS
Chief Justice Roberts, joined in full by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, thought that Parents Involved was an easy case. Resolving the case
required the Court to apply the lesson of Brown. Especially in the educa-
tional context, the Chief Justice wrote, "history will be heard."'14 For
him, the teaching of history was clear: considering race in assigning chil-
dren to public schools "accord[s] differential treatment on the basis of
race."' 15 Such assignments impermissibly "determine admission to public
schools on a racial basis."' 16 Moreover, in Chief Justice Roberts's view,
the solution to our nation's racial problems was equally simple: "The
10. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2747
(2007). For a more detailed description, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1,426 F.3d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The "nonwhite"
student population included slightly more Asians than African Americans; each of those groups
made up nearly one-fourth of the pupils. The Seattle schools had a smaller but appreciable propor-
tion of Latinos as well as some Native Americans. Students in those groups were also classified as
"nonwhite." See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747 n.2.
11. Id. at 2749-50. For a more detailed description, see McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub.
Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841-48 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir.
2005), rev 'dsub nom. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
12. Brief for Respondents at 2, 24-33, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908); Brief for Respondents at 16-29, Meredith v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006).
13. Brief of Petitioner at 25-27, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908); see also Brief of Petitioner at 6-7, Meredith v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2006) (arguing that the race-conscious plans are
generally impermissible).
14. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2768.
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way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race."' 17
Justice Thomas went even further, suggesting that arguments sup-
porting the Seattle and Louisville programs were "reminiscent of [the
position] advocated by the segregationists in Brown."'18 He added that,
although "Brown decisively rejected" the arguments of the segregation-
ists, anyone who supports those programs "replicates them to a distress-
ing extent."1 9 Thomas denied the premise that the programs were about
integration at all. He explained that "outside of the context of remedia-
tion for past de jure segregation, 'integration' is simply racial balancing"
and that "racial imbalance without intentional state action to separate the
races does not amount to segregation., 20 Moreover, he rejected the no-
tion that promoting integration was legitimate, let alone beneficent. In his
words, "[E]very time the government uses racial criteria to 'bring the
races together,' someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers
an injury solely because of his or her race.'
But history speaks in different voices. Justice Kennedy, although
generally sympathetic to opponents of affirmative action in general and
of the Seattle and Louisville plans in particular, thought that Chief Jus-
tice Roberts had oversimplified the issues. According to Kennedy, "Fifty
years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us
that the problem before us defies so easy a solution," as that offered by
the Chief Justice: that "'[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.' 22 Kennedy thought
that history teaches a more complicated lesson: "The enduring hope is
that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does. 23 While
the school boards might have had a compelling interest in promoting di-
versity, he thought that the means they had chosen were not narrowly
tailored to achieve that worthy goal.
The dissenters, of course, took a rather different view. Justice Ste-
vens sharply criticized Chief Justice Roberts for oversimplifying what
Brown was all about. Brown did not, according to Stevens, condemn all
policies that used race to determine where students could go to school:
"The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black children who were
so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children
17. Id.
18. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 2783.
20. Id. at 2769 n.2.
21. Id. at 2775 (citation omitted).
22. Id at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at
2768).
23. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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struggling to attend black schools. 2 4 Justice Stevens acerbically con-
cluded that "no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 [including
Roberts's mentor, then-Justice Rehnquist] would have agreed with to-
day's decision. 25
Justice Breyer, who wrote the principal dissent that was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, went even further. According to
Justice Breyer, Brown did not reject all governmental consideration of
race; rather, it rejected segregation policies that "perpetuated a caste sys-
tem rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subor-
dination., 26 "The lesson of history," Breyer explained, "is not that efforts
to continue racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from
efforts to achieve racial integration., 27
The Parents Involved Court was ultimately divided between two
very different notions of the meaning of racial discrimination under the
Constitution. According to one view, race is an impermissible factor in
governmental decision-making. According to the other, there is no moral
equivalence between public policies that seek to bring persons of differ-
ent races together and those that aim to keep them apart. Adherents to
both views claimed to draw their inspiration from the iconic ruling in
Brown. A careful look at Brown illustrates how the justices in Parents
Involved could draw such different lessons from a case that is now more
than half a century old.
IV. THE ENIGMATIC LESSON OF BROWN
The debate among the Parents Involved justices was about the
meaning of Brown, but the unanimous ruling in Brown concealed a simi-
lar debate about what the decision actually meant and how to remedy the
constitutional evil of segregation. The opinion in Brown contains lan-
guage that can be read in different ways, and it was indeed read in dif-
ferent ways in Parents Involved. This section first explains the ambigui-
ties of the Supreme Court's opinions in both Brown decisions: the 1954
ruling on liability and the 1955 ruling on remedy. Next it explores the
generally limited reading that the lower federal courts gave to Brown.
Finally, this section examines the Supreme Court's later insistence on
integration but notes that this insistence did not resolve the inherent am-
biguities in the original Brown opinion.
Brown did say that the "separate but equal" doctrine had "no place"
in public education and that "[s]eparate educational facilities are
24. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2800.
26. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (citation omitted).
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inherently unequal. 28 Moreover, the Brown Court stated that "[t]o sepa-
rate [children in grade and high schools] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferior-
ity as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone., 29 However, these statements
do not unequivocally reflect a colorblind view of the Constitution. Be-
fore making the statements, the Brown Court had phrased "the question
presented" in terms that focused only on the effects of segregation on
African American children: "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the mi-
nority group of equal educational opportunities? 30
The remedial ruling the following year in Brown 1131 was equally
ambiguous. The brief opinion in Brown H simply reiterated that Brown I
had articulated "the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in
public education is unconstitutional" and that "[a]ll provisions of federal,
state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield
to this principle. 3 2 The Supreme Court then remanded the cases to the
trial courts "to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees
consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to pub-
lic schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed
the parties to these cases. 3 3 This cryptic opinion did not define "racial
discrimination" or "racially nondiscriminatory basis," leaving the resolu-
tion of these questions to the lower courts.
Not surprisingly, the Court's studied ambiguity generated uncer-
tainty and confusion. The ambiguity involved the same issue that lay at
the heart of the Parents Involved debate: eliminating segregation versus
promoting integration. Was the remedy for the constitutional violation
that Brown had identified simply to strike down all laws and policies
mandating segregated schools, or was it to require that children of
different races attend school together? If the latter, how many children
were to attend which schools, and when should they do so?
One influential approach, assumed to have been written by Chief
Judge John Parker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott,34 took the former view.35 The
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
29. Id. at 494.
30. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
32. Id. at 298.
33. Id. at 301.
34. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (3-judge court) (per curiam).
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Supreme Court, he wrote, "has not decided that the states must mix per-
sons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they
attend. 3 6 He added: "What [the Court] has decided, and all that it has
decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the
right to attend any school that it maintains.... The Constitution, in other
words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination., 37
That is, the Constitution "merely forbids the use of governmental power
to enforce segregation., 38 Many other federal judges in the South reliedto9
on the so-called Parker dictum to justify a restrictive reading of Brown.39
The Supreme Court largely avoided resolving the uncertainty. To
be sure, Cooper v. Aaron n° in an extraordinary opinion signed by all
nine justices, reiterated the constitutional principles announced in Brown.
However, that decision was limited; it responded to extreme defiance led
by Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas which prompted President Ei-
senhower to dispatch federal troops to Little Rock to enforce a district
judge's order desegregating Central High School.41 Not until 1968, a full
thirteen years after Brown II, did the justices return to the remedial ques-
tion in Green v. County School Board.42 By then, both Congress and the
executive branch had taken the lead in dismantling the rigid segregation
of public schools. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)
of 196543 made unprecedented amounts of federal financial assistance
available to public schools, but Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196444
35. A quarter-century earlier, the Senate rejected Parker's nomination for a seat on the Su-
preme Court in large measure because of his perceived hostility to civil rights for African Ameri-
cans. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of Political Debate, 11 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 407, 414 (1993). Nevertheless, Parker was not completely unsympathetic to claims
of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Alston v. Sch. Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (reversing the
district court and declaring unconstitutional a Norfolk, Virginia salary schedule that explicitly dis-
criminated against African American teachers).
36. Briggs, 132 F. Supp. at 777.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 22-23 (1961).
40. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41. See generally TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1984); IRVING J. SPITZBERG, RACIAL POLITICS IN LITTLE ROCK, 1954-1964
(1987); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the
Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997). For the perspective of one of the
Little Rock Nine, see MELBA PATTILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON'T CRY (1994). For the perspective
of one of the local NAACP leaders who supported the students who desegregated Central High
School, see DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK (1962).
42. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
43. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004)).
44. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to
200d-4 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
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prohibited recipients of federal money from engaging in racial discrimi-
nation. Many southern school districts chose to desegregate in order to
retain their eligibility for ESEA funds.45
In Green, which addressed the question of remedy a full thirteen
years after the cryptic opinion in Brown 11, the Court stated: "The burden
on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.",4 6 In refer-
ring to a "plan" that must "work," the Court clearly meant that students
of different races must actually be attending school with each other. The
school board had been using a "freedom of choice" plan under which
children could choose which school they would attend. 47 The Court de-
termined, however, that the "freedom of choice" plan was insufficient:
In the context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long stand-
ing, the fact that in 1965 the Board opened the doors of the former"white" school to Negro children and of the "Negro" school to
white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the
Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated sys-
tem.48
However adequate a freedom of choice plan might have been as an im-
mediate response to the school segregation cases, the Court found it"relevant that this first step did not come until some 11 years after Brown
I was decided and 10 years after Brown II directed the making of a'prompt and reasonable start.' 4 9 It was too late in the day to temporize
about desegregation: "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run
out."' 50 Rejecting the school board's argument that the plaintiffs were
seeking "compulsory integration," 5' the Court pointed out that "not a
single white child has chosen to attend the [previously all-African
American] school" and that 85% of the African American children con-
tinued to attend that school.52 In short, the test for whether a plan worked
was whether it resulted in a racially mixed student body.
45. See generally GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION (1969).
46. 391 U.S. at 439.
47. Id. at 433-34. The board adopted the freedom of choice plan in 1965 to remain eligible for
federal financial assistance. For the previous decade, students in New Kent County and elsewhere in
Virginia were assigned to schools by a state pupil-placement agency that was established as part of
the commonwealth's Massive Resistance to Brown. See id. at 433; see generally NUMAN V.
BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 108-18, 126-34 (1969); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA 30-107 (1976).
48. Green, 391 U.S. at 437.
49. Id. at 438.
50. Id. at 438 (quoting Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)).
51. Id. at 437.
52. Id. at 441.
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Although the Green Court rejected purely formal desegregation
(under which laws and policies requiring separate schools were over-
turned while children of different races continued to attend different
schools) and endorsed substantive desegregation (under which students
of different races attended school together), there are at least two reasons
for not reading too much into the decision. First, the New Kent County
school district was located in a rural area with little or no residential seg-
regation, a roughly equal population of African Americans and whites,
and only two schools, one of which was open only to white children and
the other to African Americans.53 Getting children of both races into the
same schools therefore would pose few logistical challenges. Second, the
district had de jure segregation under the laws of Virginia, the birthplace
of Massive Resistance to Brown. 5
4
Accordingly, Green did not address situations like those in Seattle
and Louisville. Neither of those school districts had legally segregated
schools when they adopted the plans at issue in Parents Involved. The
issue in Parents Involved was whether school boards in districts that
were not legally segregated had either the discretion or the duty to pro-
mote integration. Moreover, post-Green decisions such as Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,5 5 which required racially
mixed student bodies in large urban school districts, also failed to ad-
dress the issues presented in Parents Involved because they involved
school districts that previously had been segregated by law. On the other
hand, some of the reasoning in Milliken v. Bradley,5 6 which exempted
suburban school districts from the remedial provisions for unconstitu-
tionally segregated central-city school districts unless the suburban dis-
tricts also practiced unconstitutional segregation, suggested some limits
on the extent of any proactive duty to maximize integration.
Neither Brown nor Green entirely resolved whether segregation
was impermissible (1) because the Constitution is colorblind, as
maintained by the majority in Parents Involved, or (2) because the Con-
stitution embodied special solicitude for the rights and interests of Afri-
can Americans under an anti-subordination theory, as suggested by the
dissenters. This ambiguity did not begin in 1954, and it did not matter in
Brown because segregation would have been unconstitutional under ei-
ther approach. In fact, the debate over the meaning of racial discrimina-
tion can be traced back to perhaps the most celebrated dissenting opinion
53. Id. at 432.
54. See generally BARTLEY, supra note 47.
55. 402 U.S. I (1971).
56. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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in the history of the Supreme Court, that of Justice Harlan in the notori-
ous Plessy case.
V. THE AMBIGUOUS PLESSY DISSENT
In his Plessy dissent, Justice Harlan famously wrote: "Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens." 57 This sentence appeared several times in the Parents Involved
opinions, and it served as a brooding omnipresence even when it was not
quoted. In fact, Justice Harlan's views were much more complex than
any of the Parents Involved opinions recognized. A careful look at those
opinions will demonstrate that colorblindness was only one aspect of
Harlan's approach.
Justices Thomas and Kennedy specifically refer to Justice Harlan's
color-blind language in Parents Involved, although Chief Justice Roberts
did not. Much of the Roberts opinion draws on the color-blind theory
without quoting or alluding to Harlan's language. That is, of course, the
clear import of the epigram in the last substantive sentence of that opin-
ion-that "to stop discrimination on the basis of race [we should] stop
discriminating on the basis of race." 58 On the other hand, Justice Ken-
nedy quoted only the first clause of the sentence, the one noting that the
Constitution is color-blind. 59 He did so to note that "as an aspiration, Jus-
tice Harlan's axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle. ''6 °
Finally, Justice Thomas, on the other hand, quoted the entire sentence
three times and made it the linchpin of his argument. 61
In reality, Justice Harlan's opinion in Plessy is more complicated
than this single sentence might suggest. This important fact was never
mentioned by the Parents Involved dissenters nor recognized by those
justices who invoked Justice Harlan's language. A careful reading of
Harlan's opinion reveals support for both the color-blind approach and
the anti-subordination theory. In addition to the famous and frequently
quoted sentence discussed in the previous paragraphs, Justice Harlan also
said: "I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have re-
gard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are
57. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
59. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Ken-
nedy has quoted the second clause of the sentence elsewhere. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
623 (1996) (beginning his opinion for the Court in a gay rights case as follows: "One century ago,
the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens."').
60. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782, 2787, 2788 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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involved., 62 If that were all he wrote, we could have more confidence
that Justice Harlan really believed that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind"
and that governments could never consider race in formulating public
policy. But that is not all he said in Plessy.
Other passages in Justice Harlan's dissent make clear that he under-
stood segregation to be a form of invidious treatment of African Ameri-
cans. Discussing the Louisiana statute that required "equal but separate"
railroad accommodations to separate white riders from passengers of
color, Harlan remarked: "Every one knows that the statute in question
had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. 63 Two sentences
later, he underscored the point to make sure that everyone got the mes-
sage: "The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal ac-
commodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to them-
selves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. 64 Moreover, on the page
after the reference to the color-blind Constitution, Harlan queried: "What
can more certainly arouse race hate, what [can] more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occu-
pied by white citizens? ' 65
Adding to the complexity of deciphering Harlan's meaning is a jar-
ring passage about the legal and constitutional status of Chinese in
America.66 He refers to persons from China as "a race so different from
our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of
the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, abso-
lutely excluded from our country. 67 What particularly exercises Harlan
in this part of his opinion is that, in his view, a "Chinaman" of marginal
legal status could ride in a white coach, whereas an African American
who might have risked his life on behalf of the Union during the Civil
War could not ride with whites who deemed themselves superior. 61 It is
62. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-55 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 557.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 560.
66. Most leading discussions of Plessy do not mention this part of Harlan's dissent. See, e.g.,
HARVEY FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 215-19 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
81-83 (1975); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 191-95 (1987); Alan F. Westin, John
Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66
YALE L.J. 637, 691-93 (1957).
67. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
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unclear whether Harlan's assessment was accurate. Three decades later,
Mississippi classified Chinese residents as legally black under its school
segregation laws.69 In any event, Harlan's disparagement of the Chinese
in Plessy was hardly unusual. He consistently displayed hostility toward
them and regularly voted against claims asserted on their behalf. 7
Putting aside the discussion of the Chinese, the other contrasting
passages in the Plessy dissent suggest that Harlan viewed the Louisiana
segregation law as invalid on either of two grounds: that it assigned rail-
road passengers to seats on the basis of their race, or that it treated Afri-
can American people as subhuman and unfit for membership in civil so-
ciety. As in Brown, resolving the tension between these theories was not
important. Segregation laws were unconstitutional under either view.
What matters is that Harlan's opinion-with or without the language
about the Chinese-reflects his own ambivalence on the subject of race.
This is hardly surprising in light of his inconsistent views about African
Americans. After all, he had owned slaves and opposed both the Eman-
cipation Proclamation and the Reconstruction amendments to the Consti-
71tution. More to the point, Harlan's opinion does not unequivocally en-
dorse the color-blind theory of the Constitution. An important strand of
his argument reflects the anti-subordination approach that views dis-
crimination against African Americans as more problematic than dis-
crimination against whites, which in turn might suggest that efforts to
promote integration are less objectionable than are efforts to promote
segregation.
The same apparent inconsistencies in Harlan's Plessy dissent can be
seen in other early cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment. For ex-
ample, in the Slaughter-House Cases,72 the Court's first foray into that
provision, Justice Miller emphasized that "the one pervading purpose" of
the amendment, "without which it would not have been even suggested,"
was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citi-
zen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him., 73 Seven years later, in Strauder v. West Virginia,74
69. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). On the other hand, within less than two dec-
ades of that ruling and before the end of the Second World War, Mississippi school districts volun-
tarily admitted Chinese students to white schools. See JAMES W. LOEWEN, THE MISSISSIPPI CHINESE
65-70, 93-96 (2d ed. 1988).
70. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 151, 157-66 (1996) (summarizing Harlan's opinions in cases involving Chinese claimants);
see also LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 121-22
(1999) (discussing Harlan's view of the Chinese as illuminating the nature of his racial attitudes).
71. See generally PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 70; Westin, supra note 66.
72.83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
73. Id. at 71.
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Justice Strong declared that it was "the colored race, for whose protec-
tion the amendment was primarily designed., 75 The Court in both of
these cases, however, recognized that the Equal Protection Clause ap-
plies to all persons, not only African Americans, and contained language
that at least implicitly condemned any form of racial discrimination. 6 In
other words, Justice Harlan was hardly alone when he suggested that
there might be more than one way to understand the Equal Protection
Clause when it comes to race.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two important points suggest that the debate over Brown will not
end any time soon, and indeed, that the debate did not even begin in 1954
with the original decision in that case. The first relates to the NAACP's
position in Brown, which Chief Justice Roberts invoked in Parents In-
volved as support for the color-blind approach.77 The NAACP was not of
one mind about its approach to segregated schools. For many years the
organization inconclusively debated two different strategies for improv-
ing educational opportunities for African Americans: an equalization
strategy that sought to rely on the separate-but-equal doctrine to force
improvements in African American schools, and a direct-attack strategy
that would seek to have Plessy overruled and replaced by a mandate to
desegregate public education. 78 Only after winning several cases involv-
ing graduate and professional education did the NAACP turn to elemen-
tary and secondary schools. 79 At this point the organization turned deci-
sively toward the direct attack.8° In at least a rhetorical sense, these
74. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
75. Id. at 307. See also id. at 306 (providing that the Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to
assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by
white persons").
76. See id. at 307 ("What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the
black as for the white . . . ?"); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72 (disclaiming the
notion that "no one else but the negro [sic] can share in [the] protection" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and that the amendment prevents states from violating rights that "properly and necessarily fall
within [its terms], though the party interested may not be of African descent").
77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767-68
(2007) (quoting NAACP Brief on Reargument and Transcript of Oral Argument in Brown 1).
78. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS, 1925-50 (1987); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS 146-52, 160-62, 204-12, 253-61 (2004); KLUGER, supra note 66, at 126-284; MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 116-49 (1994) [hereinafter TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW].
79. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
80. The earlier cases, which challenged the complete absence of advanced higher educational
opportunities for people of color in the South and border states, typically sought the admission of
qualified black applicants to law schools and other advanced-degree programs. Even if courts did not
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background facts are irrelevant. Some of the NAACP's arguments in
Brown professed support for the color-blind Constitution. Perhaps, how-
ever, those arguments could be understood as part of a broader attack on
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from mainstream society.
Justice Breyer alluded to this possibility in his dissenting opinion when
he referred to "the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system,
and 80 years of legal racial segregation" before Brown was decided. 8'
The second point relates to this nation's changing demographics.
The world in which we live and in which Parents Involved was decided
differs in important respects from the world in which Brown was liti-
gated. That was a world of black and white; there were, of course, other
racial and ethnic groups in the United States half a century ago, but in
most communities those groups were much less numerous and less rec-
ognized socially, culturally, and politically. Today this country is more
racially and ethnically diverse and so are our public schools. The Seattle
public schools were only 41% white when the Parents Involved lawsuit
was filed, and they contained more Asian American students than Afri-
can Americans. 82 Moreover, thinking about race is more complicated in a
time when we can designate ourselves as multi-racial instead of having a
census enumerator assign us to a single racial category.
In short, the Brown debate is far from over. Chief Justice Warren's
quest for unanimity in Brown meant that the single opinion papered over
differences within the Supreme Court, and the subsequent remand order
provided only minimal guidance about how to remedy the unconstitu-
tionality of segregated schools. If the debate neither began nor ended
with Brown, it assuredly will not end with Parents Involved.
order the applicants admitted to previously all-white schools, the relief typically would require at
least that the state create new programs for blacks on a separate-but-equal basis, which provided
further opportunities to contest the equality of the separate arrangements. In this sense, these cases
were consistent either with direct attack or equalization. See Jonathan L. Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, the
End of Segregation, and the Transformation of Education Law, 5 REV. LITIG. 3 (1986).
81. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The NAACP focused not only
on inferior schools but also on a wide range of racial discrimination in housing, voting, and the
criminal justice system. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1994);
KLARMAN, supra note 78; TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 78.
82. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747.
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